Friendly Feudalism: The Tibet Myth2-1

II. Secularization vs. Spirituality

What happened to Tibet after the Chinese Communists moved into the country in 1951? The treaty of that year provided for ostensible self-governance under the Dalai Lama’s rule but gave China military control and exclusive right to conduct foreign relations. The Chinese were also granted a direct role in internal administration “to promote social reforms.” Among the earliest changes they wrought was to reduce usurious interest rates, and build a few hospitals and roads. At first, they moved slowly, relying mostly on persuasion in an attempt to effect reconstruction. No aristocratic or monastic property was confiscated, and feudal lords continued to reign over their hereditarily bound peasants. “Contrary to popular belief in the West,” claims one observer, the Chinese “took care to show respect for Tibetan culture and religion.”²⁵

Over the centuries the Tibetan lords and lamas had seen Chinese come and go, and had enjoyed good relations with Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek and his reactionary Kuomintang rule in China.²⁶ The approval of the Kuomintang government was needed to validate the choice of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. When the current 14th Dalai Lama was first installed in Lhasa, it was with an armed escort of Chinese troops and an attending Chinese minister, in accordance with centuries-old tradition. What upset the Tibetan lords and lamas in the early 1950s was that these latest Chinese were Communists. It would be only a matter of time, they feared, before the Communists started imposing their collectivist egalitarian schemes upon Tibet.

The issue was joined in 1956-57, when armed Tibetan bands ambushed convoys of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army. The uprising received extensive assistance from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), including military training, support camps in Nepal, and numerous airlifts.²⁷ Meanwhile in the United States, the American Society for a Free Asia, a CIA-financed front, energetically publicized the cause of Tibetan resistance, with the Dalai Lama’s eldest brother, Thubtan Norbu, playing an active role in that organization. The Dalai Lama's second-eldest brother, Gyalo Thondup, established an intelligence operation with the CIA as early as 1951. He later upgraded it into a CIA-trained guerrilla unit whose recruits parachuted back into Tibet.²⁸

Many Tibetan commandos and agents whom the CIA dropped into the country were chiefs of aristocratic clans or the sons of chiefs. Ninety percent of them were never heard from again, according to a report from the CIA itself, meaning they were most likely captured and killed.²⁹ “Many lamas and lay members of the elite and much of the Tibetan army joined the uprising, but in the main the populace did not, assuring its failure,” writes Hugh Deane.³⁰ In their book on Tibet, Ginsburg and Mathos reach a similar conclusion: “As far as can be ascertained, the great bulk of the common people of Lhasa and of the adjoining countryside failed to join in the fighting against the Chinese both when it first began and as it progressed.”³¹ Eventually the resistance crumbled.

慈悲的封建制——西藏迷思（第二章之一）

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第二章 世俗与精神

中国共产党人于1951年进入西藏之后，那里发生了什么呢？当年订立的协议为达赖喇嘛的统治提供了表面上的自治，但是却给了中国军事控制和开展外交关系的专权。中国人还被允许直接参与西藏的内部管理，以便“推进社会改革”。政府最早期的改革包括降低高利贷利率、修建了几家医院和几条公路。开始时，他们的改革进展得很缓慢，主要是依靠说服以便能有效地开展重建。贵族或僧侣的财产没有被充公，封建领主可以继续统治他们世袭领地内的农民。“正好跟西方世界普遍想法相反，”一位观察家指出，中国人“小心翼翼地展现他们对西藏文化和信仰的尊重。”[注25]

在过去的几个世纪里，西藏领主和喇嘛已经见惯了中国的变迁，他们跟蒋介石委员长及其统治着中国的国民党保持着良好的关系。[注26]他们需要国民党政府的批准来确认达赖喇嘛和班禅喇嘛的挑选。目前的14世达赖喇嘛第一次在拉萨被任命的时候，根据西藏几个世代的传统，是中国的武装部队和一位出席任命仪式的中国部长护送的。50年代初，让西藏领主和喇嘛感到不安的是这些后来的中国统治者是共产党人。他们害怕的是，共产党将强制实施集体主义的平等制度，这不过是个时间问题。

问题在1956年到1957年期间爆发，西藏武装分子袭击了中国人民解放军的驻藏部队。这次叛乱得到了美国中央情报局的支持，包括军事训练、尼泊尔的驻扎支援，并援助了大量的空投物资。[注27]与此同时的美国，美国自由亚洲协会（American Society for a Free Asia），一个中情局支持的组织，大力地宣传此次反叛。达赖喇嘛的兄长Thubtan Norbu在该组织里扮演着一个重要角色。达赖喇嘛的二哥Gyalo Thondup早在1951年就与中情局建立了情报合作关系。随后他把这种中情局的合作升级为军事合作关系，并把训练人员潜送回西藏。[注28]

很多中情局训练后派回西藏的突击队员和特工都是贵族或者领主的子弟。根据中情局自己的一个相关报告，90%的人员都就此杳无音讯了，这意味着他们大多被捕和处决。[注29]“很多喇嘛和上层分子以及西藏军队参加了本次叛乱，但是大部分的民众并没有动作，这决定了本次叛乱的失败。”Hugh Deane[注30]曾写道。在另一本讨论西藏的书籍里，Ginsburg和Mathos也得出了相似的结论：“根据已知的事实，拉萨和附近地区的大多数人民都没有参加这场叛乱，不论是在最开始还是叛乱中。”[注31]最后，叛乱被粉碎了。

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